Abstract. The main bottleneck of all known Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes lies in the bootstrapping procedure invented by Gentry (STOC'09). The cost of this procedure can be mitigated either using Homomorphic SIMD techniques, or by performing larger computation per bootstrapping procedure. In this work, we propose new techniques allowing to perform more operations per bootstrapping in FHEW-type schemes (EUROCRYPT'13). While maintaining the quasi-quadratic O(n 2 ) complexity of the whole cycle, our new scheme allows to evaluate gates with Ω(log n) input bits, which constitutes a quasi-linear speed-up. Our scheme is also very well adapted to large threshold gates, natively admitting up to Ω(n) inputs. This could be helpful for homomorphic evaluation of neural networks. Our theoretical contribution is backed by a preliminary prototype implementation, which can perform 6-to-6 bit gates in less than 10 seconds on a single core, as well as threshold gates over 63 input bits even faster.
Introduction
Since the first scheme of Gentry [17, 16] a lot of effort has been made to push Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) toward practicality. A first line of research followed the initial approach of Gentry, by bootstrapping FHE from a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) scheme supporting arbitrary circuits of bounded depth. This bootstrapping step consists in homomorphically evaluating the decryption procedure, to refresh ciphertexts. After successive theoretical and practical improvements [32, 8, 22] , this bootstrapping procedure has been made feasible in practice, but remains quite expensive, taking several minutes on a single core. Fortunately, this cost can be mitigated thanks to SIMD techniques, allowing to perform the same homomorphic computation on several data sets for the price of one.
A second line of FHE schemes arose from the SHE scheme of Gentry-Sahai-Waters [20] . This SHE scheme supports a different class of functions, including branching programs, and this was also proved sufficient to bootstrap it to FHE via Barrington's theorem [5] . Interestingly, this approach theoretically allows obtaining FHE from a weaker version of the LWE assumption (namely the approximation factor decreases from super-polynomial to polynomial). On the efficiency front, Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [3] showed how to avoid the costly use of Barrington's transformation by implementing the homomorphic decryption procedure more directly. Then, Ducas and Micciancio [13] adapted the construction to the ring-setting. Providing parameters and implementation, This work. We aim to improve the performance of this line of FHE schemes by increasing the plaintext modulus t. Having remarked the imbalance of the costs of the linear and non-linear steps, we proceed to increase the cost of the non-linear step while maintaining the overall quasi-quadratic complexity.
Our approach consists in choosing a ciphertext modulus of the form pq for co-primes p, q, and to perform the linear-step L c in a CRT fashion. During this linear-step, our SHE scheme only works with the rings R p = Z[X]/(X p −1) and R q = Z[Y ]/(Y q −1) separately, for a cost ofÕ(n(p+q)). Then we proceed to a CRT reconstruction by tensoring the two rings: R p ⊗ R q R pq = Z[Z]/(Z pq − 1), noting that X a ⊗ Y b = Z aq+pb mod pq . This raises the cost of the non-linear part toΘ(pq). Setting p, q = Θ(n) we maintain the quasi-quadratic complexity, but reach a larger plaintext-modulus t = Θ(n). This is somehow a reminiscence of the approach of [3] , adapted to the ring-setting.
One (not so) novel technical aspect is that we choose in this work to use convolution rings Z[X]/(X p − 1), as in the NTRU schemes [24] rather than cyclotomic ones. The reason is that we need to use some non-power of 2 roots of unity to ensure co-primality of p and q. Indeed, if (say) p is prime, the fact that X p−1 = −1 − X − · · · − X p−2 in the p-th cyclotomic ring Z(X)/(Φ p (X)) makes the non-linear step described above quite problematic. 4 Yet, we show that the switch to convolution rings can be done without affecting security, by formalizing what we call the NTRU trick. 5 More precisely, an appropriately defined version of Ring-LWE over convolution rings is as secure as the usual cyclotomic version of Ring-LWE from [25] .
Our work also relies one of the improvements of [10] , namely, the use of an "external multiplication" GSW × LWE → LWE replacing the GSW × GSW → GSW operation used in [20, 3, 13, 6] , which saves a log factor on time and memory. It turns out that the trick of [15, 10] of implementing a mux-gate, is not compatible with our circulant ring set-up, but we instead propose to exploit the Galois action 6 for a similar logarithmic speed-up.
In addition, we propose to use an alternative Gadget matrices based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem, an idea already presented in [21] for different purposes. We show that such gadgets permit a logarithmic speed-up when dealing with gadget inversions of tensored ciphertexts; this contribution may find theoretical and practical applications in other contexts.
To summarize our theoretical construction, we provide schematics in Figure 1 , omitting some extra tweaks for practical efficiency that are deferred to Appendix B. We hope this overview may guide the reader through our paper.
Circular security. We recall that all the FHE literature, including our work, relies on (sometimes implicit) circular-security assumptions [16] , that may be different from one scheme to the next. Understanding those assumptions is arguably the most important theoretical question in this field.
One particular property of our scheme is that this circular security assumption can not be avoided even when relaxing the scheme to a leveled FHE scheme [16] . Indeed, the careful reader may notice that "External Inner-product in the Exponent" step (ExtExpInner, Section 4.3) requires circular encryption. 
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On the left side, there are the k input bits m1, · · · , m k that get combined into m ∈ Zt. On the right side we have the two Homomorphic Accumulator ExtExpInner, which perform the linear part Lc of the bootstrapped computation in a CRT fashion. After tensoring it is fed to the non-linear part of the computation N f : x → f ( tx/q mod t), i.e. FunExpExtract, where f is the function to be homomorphically evaluated. The computation is intrinsically done with the bootstrapping process, so the final output can directly be used as input. Grey boxes represent operations, white square boxes represent ciphertexts, and rounded white boxes represent key material. The linear step Lc and the non-linear step N f discussed in introduction are highlighted by dashed red circles.
Instantiation and implementation. To attest to the feasibility of our approach, we also provide an instantiation supporting 7 6-to-6 bit gates, at a security level of about 100 bits. Its current implementation runs this 6-to-6 bits bootstrapped gate in about 10 seconds.
Related work. Recently Chillotti et al. [11] also proposed the construction of large homomorphic gates, using a quite different approach. They claim impressive performances, such as a 16-to-8 bit homomorphic gate running in about 2 seconds. Admittedly, our current implementation is significantly slower. One case for which our approach might be advantageous is the case of threshold gates: for example, our 6-bit scheme can natively support threshold gates over 63 input bits with the same performance.
Impact. Our implementation should certainly not be understood as publicity for the practical efficiency of this overall design. It nevertheless serves the purpose of demonstrating that our new building blocks can be used inside a reasonable scheme. It is therefore plausible that our contributions are not only of theoretical interest, but may as well find some use in future practical FHE designs.
Plan. We begin in Section 2 with preliminary results and notations. Then we introduce the underlying encryption schemes at hand in Section 3. Section 4 presents in detail the building blocks of the gate, leading to the overall description in Section 5. Finally Section 6 reports implementation details and performances.git
In addition, Appendix A provides the hardness proof for Circulant-LWE and the cpa-security proofs of the associated cryptosystems. Appendix B provides several useful optimization of our scheme for its concrete efficiency.
-If X 1 and X 2 are independent,
Note that [33] also defines non-centered subgaussian variables. However, in this work, we only consider centered ones, ie. with E[X] = 0.
Rings
Our FHE scheme uses circulant convolution rings (or, for short, circulant rings). Circulant rings of degree d will be denoted with indeterminate T :
. We fix two distinct odd primes p and q. When speaking specifically of rings R p , R q , and R pq we shall use indeterminates X, Y and Z, respectively. We writeR d for the cyclotomic ring
We identify a ring element a ∈ R d with its lowest degree representative a 0 + a 1 T + . . .
and call a 0 , . . . , a d−1 the coefficients of a. We identify a ∈ R d /QR d with its lowest degree representative with coefficients a 0 , . . . , a d−1 ∈ [−Q/2, Q/2). We define the following norms for ring elements:
We define the operator norm of a as |a| = max b∈R\{0} ab / b . We expand this notion to vectors x ∈ R n d by maximizing y over R n \ {0} and replacing the multiplication with the inner product over R d . 
In Section 4, we need to bound the subgaussinity parameter of e + d, e where e and the components of e are independent γ-and δ-subgaussian variables over R d , and d is a random variable over R n d , independent of e, such that for some constant k, |d i | ≤ k. Note that we do not assume that e and d are independent. Thus, if we apply Theorem 1 in a straightforward way, we obtain a subgaussinity parameter of γ + k √ nδ. However, we can do better: The following lemma shows that we can bound the parameter by γ 2 + k 2 nδ 2 .
Lemma 2. Let e be a γ-subgaussian variable over R d and e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) be a vector of independent δ-subgaussian random variables over R d . Let d be a random variable over R n d such that |d i | ≤ k for all i. If d and e are independent and e and e are independent, then e + d, e is γ 2 + k 2 nδ 2 -subgaussian.
Proof. We first consider the case where e = 0 and d is a fixed vector instead of a random variable. For every b ∈ R d and every i, we have Tr
From the independence of the e i , it follows that Tr( d, e b)/ b is ( √ nkδ)-subgaussian. If d and e are random variables independent of e, it holds for every b ∈ R d that
which concludes the proof.
Finally, we show that if we trace down a subgaussian random variable over R pq down to R p , the result is a subgaussian random variable over R p . 
Gadgets
Throughout this exposition we use a binary decomposition operation on ring elements, and the reverse. For simplicity we adopt the notation of gadget vector and matrix.
is a (K × n)-matrix whose entries are ring elements with coefficients in {0, 1} such that g T V = w.
Definition 7. For some integer n ≥ 1, the gadget matrix G n is defined by
be the vector whose entries have coefficients in {0, 1} such that d T · G = a. For convenience we write G n = G as n is typically clear from context.
Circulant LWE and reduction to Ring-LWE
It is well known that the naive decisional version of Ring-LWE is insecure over circulant rings, simply by exploiting the CRT decomposition. Say that d is prime, and note that R d /QR d R d /QR d ×Z/QZ if Q is coprime to d, so one may mount an attack on the Z/QZ part (projecting to this part corresponds to evaluate the polynomial at 1, and therefore maintain smallness of the error). However, this does not mean that such rings are inherently insecure: the NTRU cryptosystems [24, 23] use circulant rings, choosing the secret key and errors that evaluate to a fixed known value (say 0) at 1.
This suggests a strategy to construct a variant of Ring-LWE over circulant rings that would be as secure as the cyclotomic Ring-LWE, simply by lifting all elementsx ∈R d /QR d to x (x, 0), yet this reverse CRT operation may not keep small elements small. In Appendix A.1 we show how to circumvent this obstacle, and discuss error sampling in practice in Appendix A.3.
Encryption schemes

LWE Encryption
We recall the definition of the most basic LWE symmetric encryption scheme (see [7, 29, 4] ). LWE symmetric encryption is parametrized by a dimension n, a message modulus t ≥ 2, a ciphertext modulus Q = n O(1) and an error distribution χ. The message space of the scheme is Z t . (Typically, e ← χ satisfies the condition |e| < Q/2t, and t = 2 is used to encrypt message bits.) The (secret) key of the encryption scheme is a vector s ∈ Z n Q , which may be chosen uniformly at random, or as a random short vector. The encryption of a message m ∈ Z t under key
where a ← Z n Q is chosen uniformly at random. A ciphertext (a, b) is decrypted by computing
We write c ∈ LWE t|Q s (m) to denote that c is an LWE-encryption of m, and c ∈ LWE t|Q s (m; E) if c is a random LWE-ciphertext such that c = (a, a, s + Q/t m + e) where e is a subgaussian random variable with parameter E. The error of c = (
Notice that the error err(a, b) depends not just on (a, b), but also on s, Q, t and m. By the subgaussian tail estimate, if e = err(c) is subgaussian with parameter E, then |e| < √ 2λE except with probability at most 2 exp(−λ). Thus, if t divides Q and E ≤ Q/(2t √ 2λ), the decryption procedure recovers the encrypted message with high probability:
Q |e| < 1/2 except with probability 2 exp(−λ).
CLWE and CGSW Encryption Schemes
Below, we describe two encryption schemes, Circulant-LWE and Circulant-GSW 9 , which we need for our homomorphic accumulator (see Section 4). We do not specify any decryption procedures since these are not needed for the homomorphic accumulator.
CLWE Encryption Scheme.
Definition 8. We let R,R, d, and Q be as in Section 2.2. Let t ≥ 2 be the plaintext modulus. The Circulant-LWE scheme over R consists of the following algorithms:
-KeyGen: Output a uniformly random element s ofR.
-Enc s (m) for m ∈ R/tR: Let (a, b) be a sample from the Circulant-LWE distribution over R with secret s and output (a,
We also define an n-dimensional variant of the scheme where the key is s ∈ R n , a is a random vector in R n and the product a · s is replaced by the inner product over
Lemma 4.
If the decisionalR-LWE problem is hard, then the Circulant-LWE over scheme is cpasecure for messages of the form m = X k .
We defer this proof to Appendix A.2.
CGSW Encryption Scheme.
Definition 9. We let R,R, d, and Q be as in Section 2.2 and G as in Definition 7. Furthermore, let t ≥ 2 be the plaintext modulus and B an integer ≥ 2, let K be the smallest integer such that
The Circulant-GSW scheme is described by the following algorithms:
-KeyGen: Sample a uniformly random s fromR.
-Enc s (m) for m ∈ R/tR: Generate a matrix A ∈ R 2K×2 where each row is a sample from the Circulant-LWE distribution with secret s. Output A + Q/t · mG.
We also define a n-dimensional variant of the scheme where A ∈ R (n+1)K×(n+1) whose rows are samples from the n-dimensional Circulant-LWE and where G 1 is replaced by G n .
Lemma 5.
If the decisionalR-LWE problem is hard, then the Circulant-GSW scheme is cpa-secure.
Ciphertext Spaces.
for some random error vector e that is E-subgaussian. We extend the notation to
. Furthermore, we write err(c) for the error term e in c.
-
· mG, and the components of e are independent E-subgaussian variables. We write err(C) for the error vector e in C. 9 Based on [20] .
Homomorphic Operations
Most of the operations presented below are meaningful both in the ring/circulant-setting or over the integers. We consider the RLWE problem over rings
with d prime and over R = Z (i.e., simply the LWE problem). However, most of the results presented in this section also hold for cyclotomic rings. We assume that coefficients of ring elements in R/QR can be added and multiplied in constant time since, in our implementation, each coefficient fits into a machine word. Thus, adding two ring elements takes time O(d) and multiplying them takes time O(d log d) using FFT.
Known Building Blocks
Let us first recall, within our formalism, known building blocks from the literature. The only novelty is in this section concerns the FunExpExtract function: while this was already constructed in previous work, in our set-up we will need to apply a trick from [19] to improve its efficiency. Linearity.
Key Material: None Runtime: O(nd) for addition, O(nd log d) for multiplication Signature:
The error term in the result of Add holds when the error terms in the input ciphertexts are independent. Otherwise, it is E + E .
The Add operations are computed by simply adding the ciphertexts component-wise. The Mult x operations work by scalar multiplication with x. If e is subgaussian with parameter E, then x · e is subgaussian with parameter |x|E since, for all b, Tr * (xeb)/ b ≤ |x| Tr * (e(xb))/ xb , and Tr * (e(xb))/ xb is E-subgaussian.
Modulus Switching. Key Material:
where
The basic idea of modulus switching is to multiply the ciphertext with Q /Q, or rather Q /t / Q/t . However, since this factor is not necessarily an integer, we instead use a randomized rounding function [x] = x +B r where B r is a Bernoulli random variable with Pr[B r = 1] = x− x . The rounding error r = [x] − x is subgaussian with parameter 1. Let us write k = Q /t / Q/t . Applying the rounding function component-wise to k · (a, a, s + Q/t m + e), we obtain (ka + r, k a, s + Q /t m + ke + r ) = (ka + r, ka + r, s + Q /t m + ke + r − r, s ) where r is the vector of rounding errors for ka and r is the rounding error for b. Thus, the error term of the modulus-switched ciphertext is ke + r − r, s . For each i, r i s i is |s i |-subgaussian. Since all terms in the sum are independent, the error parameter is (kE) 2 + 1 + i |s i | 2 .
Remark 1. We only use modulus switching in the following two cases: when the dimension of the key is n = 1, and for short keys in Z n , i.e., n-dimensional keys where |s i | ≤ 1. In the first case, the error parameter simplifies to (kE) 2 + 1 + |s| 2 , in the second case to (kE) 2 + n + 1.
Key switching.
where Proof. By definition of g −T , it is easy to see that the error term is e −
Thus, the second part of the lemma follows. The first part holds because for every i, g −T (a i )e i is subgaussian with parameter at most √ Kdσ. If the error terms are independent, it follows that the error parameter is as stated in the algorithm.
Remark 2. In practice, the choice of the basis decomposition B for the gadget is important. It allows to trade off key size and running time against error growth. We use
, with K = log B Q as key material. The key size decreases to O(nn dK log Q), and the running time decreases to O(d log dnn K), while the output error parameter also increases to
External Multiplication. Key Material: None Runtime: O(Kd log d) Signature: ExtMult :
for s ∈ R if Q/t is invertible modulo Q.
Algorithm 2 is correct. Furthermore, for e = err(c) and e = err(C), the error term of the output is X k · e + d T e for some k and a random vector d ∈ R Proof. Write u = Q/t , so c = (a, as + e + Q/t T m ) and C = (a, a, s + e) + uT m G. Let
We have:
Each component of e is independent and subgaussian with parameter E , and d is a vector in R 2K d , where each entry has binary coefficients. Thus, for every i, we have |d i | ≤ d. By Lemma 2, the error parameter follows.
Exponent Function Extraction.
Key Material: A key-switch key S from
for some function F : Z pq → Z t where |F | = i∈Zpq |F (i)| and s ∈ Z p .
Let us first consider the function F 0 that maps 0 → 1 and k → 0 for k = 0. If we can extract this function, we can extract any function by first multiplying the ciphertext with an appropriate polynomial.
This extraction is easily provided by the trace function Tr
, where a, s ∈ Z pq are the vectors of coefficients of a and s.
However, this leads to an LWE ciphertext with quadratic dimension pq = Θ(n 2 ), that must be key-switched to a much smaller dimension Θ(n). Such a key-switch without any ring structure would require up toΘ(n 3 ) running time, and as much key-material. To circumvent this issue, we exploit the intermediate ring, following one of the tricks of [18] . Namely, we choose a key in R p , which can also be viewed as an element of R pq . Switching to this key, exploiting the structure of R pq , requires onlyΘ(pq) =Θ(n 2 ) operations. Then, one can trace a down to R p , and b down to Z, and obtain the desired result.
Algorithm 3 FunExpExtract
: Turn an R pq LWE encryption of Z m into an LWE encryption of F (m).
Require:
A ciphertext c ∈ RpqLWE
Lemma 8. Algorithm 3 is correct and runs in time O(pq log(pq) log Q ).
Proof. We can compute Tr * Rpq/Rp (x) by examining p coefficients of x, and Tr * Rp/Z (x) is simply the constant term of x. Thus, the runtime is dominated by the key-switch, which runs in time O(pq log(pq)K). After the multiplication and key-switch, it holds that
since |f | ≤ |F |. Using Lemma 3, the linearity of the trace function, and the fact that s ∈ R p , we conclude that after the trace,
and by Lemma 1, Tr * i∈Zpq
s and Tr
* does not increase the error parameter, the correctness of our algorithm follows.
Remark 3. Note that we could reduce the error parameter in Algorithm 3 by performing the multiplication before the key-switch. However, doing the key-switch first allows to amortize the cost of gates with multiple outputs, as we shall describe in section B.3.
New Building Blocks
Exponent Multiplication by Galois Conjugation. Key Material: None Runtime: O(nd) Signature: Galois α :
where α ∈ Z * d and ψ α is the automorphism of R d defined by T → T α .
Given a R d LWE-ciphertext (a, as + Q/t T m + e), by applying ψ α component-wise, we obtain (ψ α (a), ψ α (a) · ψ α (s) + Q/t T αm + ψ α (e)). Applying Galois α does not change the error parameter because Tr Signature: ExpCRT:
Note that the condition t · Q ⊗ /t = 1 can be easily satisfied in our bootstrapping scheme because we perform a modulus switch before and after ExpCRT.
Algorithm 4
We will need the following lemma to bound the tensor product of two subgaussian random variables.
Lemma 9. Let A and B be independent subgaussian random variables on R p and R q , respectively, with parameters γ and δ. Then, for every λ ∈ R, A⊗B is subgaussian with parameter √ 2λγδ except with probability 2 min(p, q) exp(−λ).
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Proof. We want to show that for every y ∈ R pq \ {0}, Tr * ((A ⊗ B)y)/ y is subgaussian (except with a small probability). Let y ∈ R pq \ {0}. We can write y =
y Let E i be the event that | Tr * (Ay i )| ≥ √ 2λγ y i . Applying the subgaussian tail estimate, we conclude that for each i, p(E i ) ≤ 2 exp(−λ). By the union bound, it follows that, for E = i E i , p(E) ≤ 2q exp(−λ). We now proceed similarly to the proof of Lemma 
We can then use the independence of A and B to conclude that, conditioned on E, Tr * ((A⊗B)y)/ y is ( √ 2λγδ)-subgaussian, as claimed. Using a similar argument, this time writing y = p−1 i=0 X i ⊗ y i , it also follows that Tr * ((A ⊗ B)y)/ y is ( √ 2λγδ)-subgaussian except with probability 2p exp(−λ). This proves our claim.
Lemma 10. Algorithm 4 is correct and runs in time Θ(pq).
Proof. Let m = αqm p + βpm q mod pq. It holds that m mod p = m p and m mod q = m q . Thus, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, m = m. Let s p = ψ α (s p ) and s q = ψ β (s q ). Let us write b p = uX αmp + e p and b q = Q ⊗ Y βmq /t + e q . We have
Since e p and e q are independent, the sum of the first two terms is subgaussian with parameter
The third term is subgaussian with parameter t √ 2λE p E q , except with probability 2 min(p, q) exp(−λ) by Lemma 9. In total, e pq is subgaussian with parameter E 2 p + E 2 q +t √ 2λE p E q except with probability 2 min(p, q) exp(−λ). Thus, with a = (a p ⊗ a q , a p ⊗ b q , b p ⊗ a q ) and
, an easy computation shows that tb p ⊗b q −t a, s = tb p ⊗b q = Q ⊗ /t Z m +e pq . The algorithm is correct.
The running time is dominated by the cost of tensoring the ring elements, which takes time Θ(pq).
Evaluating Inner Products in Exponents
This procedure allows evaluation of inner products in exponents with log d times less homomorphic additions in exponents than in FHEW, also less key material.
As a subroutine, we construct an (External) Multiply-and-Add operation in the exponent, for a public coefficient α ∈ Z * d . We defer the error analysis of this step to the next algorithm (Theorem 2) with = 1. External Multiply-and-Add in the Exponent.
Key Material: Key-switch keys S α (from ψ α (s) to s) and S β (from ψ β (s) to s), where
Remark 4. A similar speed-up was obtained in [10] using a different technique, namely a Mux operation. We are unfortunately unable to use it in our circulant set-up, essentially because encryptions of 0 are not allowed: our ind-cpa-security guarantee (Lemma 4) only applies to encryptions of X m for some m ∈ Z d . Yet our technique is more general, precisely, we do not restrict the secret input vector to have binary coefficients.
By chaining, this allows us to evaluate inner products x, y over Z d in the exponent, given GSW encryptions R d GSW t|Q s (T xi ) and a public vector of coefficients y ∈ Z d .
External Inner-product in the Exponent.
Key Material: Key-switch keys S α from ψ α (s) to s, for every
Algorithm 6 ExtExpInner
Theorem 2. Algorithm 6 is correct and runs in time Θ(lKd log d).
Proof. By induction, we prove that the error term of c in the i-th iteration of the for-loop is of the form e 1 + e 2 where e 1 is (2id √ Kσ)-subgaussian, and
) with the following
properties: e (j) is the error vector of C j , and
is a random vector with |d
for all k ≥ j. Clearly, our claim holds prior to the loop (with i = 0) since c has no error term at this point. Suppose now that the claim holds for i − 1. Let α = y i and β = α −1 mod d. During the ExtExpMultAdd operation, we first apply a Galois operation, which results in an error term of ψ β (e 1 ) + ψ β (e 2 ). This is followed by a key-switch, which, by Lemma 6, changes the error to ψ β (e 1 ) + ψ β (e 2 ) + e ks,1 where e ks,1 is independent of e j for all j, and subgaussian with parameter √ Kdσ. Next comes an ExtMult operation which changes it to X k ψ β (e 1 ) + X k ψ β (e 2 ) + X k e ks,1 + d, e (i) for some k, where e is the error in C i , and d ∈ R 2K d is a random vector independent of e (j) for j ≥ i which satisfies |d n | ≤ d for every n, by Lemma 7. After the second Galois and key-switch, the error term becomes X αk e 1 + X αk e 2 + X αk ψ α (e ks,1 ) + ψ α d, e
+ ψ α (e ks,2 ) where e ks,2 is again subgaussian with parameter √ Kdσ. We can reorder the error terms and write X αk e 1 + X αk ψ α (e ks,1 ) + ψ α (e ks,2 )
By the induction hypothesis and since e ks,1 and e ks,2 are subgaussian with parameter d √ Kσ, it follows that e 1 is (2id √ Kσ)-subgaussian (because we do not assume that e 1 , e ks,1 and e ks,2 are independent). Finally, it holds that
and thus, setting
which completes the induction step. Finally, by repeated applications of Lemma 2, we conclude that the error term in the output is subgaussian with parameter
It is easy to see that the algorithm has the claimed runtime by adding up the runtimes of the algorithms used in ExtExpMultAdd.
Remark 5. The asymmetry in the error parameter √ 4K 2 d 2 σ 2 + 2K d 2 E 2 with 2 on the lefthand side and on the right is due to the fact that key-switch keys can be reused in multiple loop iterations. Thus, the error parameter that we state in Algorithm 6 represents the worst case where we have the same α in every loop iteration, and α = α −1 mod d. In practice, this will happen very rarely, so we can expect an error parameter close to K d 2 4σ 2 + 2E 2 .
Joining the building blocks
In this section, we explain how the building blocks we described in Section 4 fit together to form the homomorphic evaluation and bootstrapping procedure EvalBootstrap. See Fig. 1 for a schematic overview. We build an algorithm that, given ciphertexts c i ∈ LWE s (m i ; E in ), i ∈ {1, . . . , k} with s ∈ Z p Q a short vector (i.e., s i ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all i), a function f : Z t → Z t , and coefficients
We do not assume that the error terms in the c i are independent of each other, or independent of the key material used by EvalBootstrap: if an input c i is the result of a previous application of EvalBootstrap, then its error term is not independent of the error terms in the bootstrapping/evaluation key material. We use the following parameters for the building blocks:
-n as the security parameter,
-λ = Θ(n) such that λ ≤ q as the failure parameter; the decryption and homomorphic evaluation procedures should only fail with probability exponentially small in λ, -σ as the error parameter used in the key material,
For m i ∈ {0, 1}, the algorithm can evaluate arbitrary k-bit gates if t ≥ 2 k , using γ i = 2 i−1 and an appropriately chosen f . We can compute a threshold gate if t > k by setting γ i = 1 for all i. Theorem 3. Algorithm 7 is correct and runs in timeÕ(n 2 ). Moreover, there exists Q = O(γ |f |n 6.5 σ 1.5 ) such that the output of EvalBootstrap can be used as input for another execution of EvalBootstrap with coefficients γ 1 , . . . , γ k such that γ = i |γ i | (with failure probability exponentially small in n).
Proof. It is straighforward to verify the error parameters for each step in the comments of the algorithm. There are two steps where failures might occur: the ExpCRT step, and the FunExpExtract step. The failure probability for ExpCRT is 2 exp(−λ). FunExpExtract will not fail to extract the value of F , but if the error term in c is too large, the output might not be an encryption of f (m). The subgaussian tail estimate guarantees that the failure probability is at most 2 exp(−λ) if r 2 γ 2 E 2 in + p + 1 ≤ pq/(2t √ 2λ) where r = pq/t / Q /t . Since t ≤ √ pq/4 and λ ≤ q, this condition is satisfied if r 2 γ 2 E 2 in + p + 1 ≤ √ 2p, or equivalently,
The runtime is dominated by ExtExpInner and FunExpExtract, which run in time O(nKd log d) and O(Kpq log(pq)), respectively. Given our asymptotic parameter choices, both of those areÕ(n 2 ). If we want to use outputs of EvalBootstrap as inputs for another execution of EvalBootstrap, where the absolute values of the coefficients sum up to γ , we require that γ E out ≤ T . From the asymptotic formulas for E out and T , it is easy to see that this inequality can be satisfied by a Q in O(|f |γ n 6.5 σ 1.5 ).
Implementation
In addition to the formal analysis, we developed a complete implementation of the scheme. Our objective was to make it efficient and usable. We present below the key techniques that enable us to evaluate a 6-bit gate in roughly 6.4 seconds on a laptop.
Implementation details
FFT The most intensive computations throughout the scheme are the multiplications of ring elements. For efficiency this is classically done in the frequency domain. The cost for a multiplication decreases from Θ(n c ) down to Θ(n log n), where c = log(3) in the case of Karatsuba algorithm for example. Since we are dealing with circulant ring elements, we may wish to run the FFT operation in the ring dimension exactly. But our ring dimensions are prime, which is the worst case for FFT efficiency. We ran some benchmarks and it turned out that it was much faster to use a bigger dimension (with small prime factors), and do the polynomial reduction afterwards. Also we do not meet the conditions to apply NTT (our moduli are not primes), so our choice was to stick with FFT computations and we use the FFTW library [14] for the forward and backward transforms.
More challenges arose with FFT computations since our biggest modulus is Q = 2 56 and the FFT works with double precision numbers (i.e. 53 bits mantissa). So we have to split the ring coefficients into two halves of 28 bits each and apply the FFT transformation on each to prevent rounding errors. We perform this splitting trick only when needed, ie when the ring element is not small. For example, in ExtMult products of ring element are computed where one of the operands is the output of a Gadget decomposition. This operand needs not be split before FFT forward transform because it is very small.
Pre-computations
In order to minimize the evaluation time of the gate, a maximum of heavy computations are done in the setup phase. Consequently all keys materials: bootstrapping keys, keyswitching keys, among others, are computed ahead of time and in FFT domain. Our CirculantRing class allows to transparently manipulate ring element in FFT or coefficient representation which greatly contribute to both performance and code readability.
Further optimization The implementation has been done in C++11, using its most convenient and efficient features. For example, all classes are extensively defined with template parameters (dimension, moduli, basis decomposition...). This trick allows the computer to know, at compile time, the values of many variables (eg. loop ranges). The compiler then produces dedicated and highly optimized binaries.
On our benchmark laptop with gcc 7.1.1, we also tweaked the optimization flags to save 5% more time than the usual -O2, which already saves 75%.
Open-source Many efforts have also been made for general availability and usability. The whole code is documented with Doxygen and many unitary tests are provided. With under 4,000 lines of code, it remains accessible to whoever wants to tweak or improve it. The implementation is publicly available and open-source 11 . At the first start (and only then), heavy computations are performed by the FFTW components, in order to optimize the FFT for the current computer.
Parameters
For our first implementation, we targeted a 6-bit input gate. The parameters of the scheme are as follows:
-For 6 input bits, the plaintext modulus t = 2
6 . -The ring dimensions p and q are 1439 and 1447, so pq = 2, 077, 892.
Hence the FFT dimensions are d For ExpCRT we want a small inverse to Q ⊗ /t mod Q ⊗ . Hence we choose Q ⊗ = (2 19 − t + 1) 2 . Finally, for the gadget decomposition we use B = 2 8 and K = 7 for ExtExpInner and FunExpExtract and their key material.
We also have extra parameters related an to optimization presented in Appendix B.1. Namely, we apply an extra KeySwitch over LWE ciphertext to decrease the length l of the decryption innerproduct from l = p = 1439 down to l = 600. This key-switch happens with modulus Q = 2 56 , error standard deviation 2 33 , and gadget parameters B = 2 6 , K = 10.
Error growth and Correctness To choose the parameters, we simulated the error growth throughout the gate, using heuristic error propagation assumption, described in Appendix B.2. This simulation script is provided with the code as file scripts/parameters.sage. We compared the predicted variance of each step to the experimental one, and found them to be corroborated. From the final variance, and according to a central limit heuristic, we predict a failure probability of only 2
for the above parameter set. In practice we have tested our scheme hundreds of time on different inputs, and never observed failure.
Security To estimate the concrete security of our parameter set, we use the lwe-estimator from Albrecht [2] . All the LWE instances behind our LWE, R p LWE, R q LWE ciphertexts given as part of the evaluation key offers at least 100 bits of security, according to the estimator as of commit cc5f6e8, which includes the latest result of [1] for small secrets. Therefore we feel safe to claim at least 80 bits of security.
11 https://github.com/gbonnoron/Borogrove
Performances
We run our test on a punchy laptop: Core i7-6500U (2.50 GHz, 4MB L2 cache), 16 GB RAM with a GNU/Linux Fedora 26 installed on a SSD. The computation is single-threaded and we got the following timings:
-FFTW wisdom computation (only once per computer): 68 minutes -Key pre-processing (once per user key pair): 38 seconds -6-bit input, 1-bit output gate evaluation: 6.4 seconds
The gate time breaks down into: 0.60 s per ExtExpInner (the two could be run in parallel), 4.0 s for the KeySwitch in FunExpExtract and only 0.55 s for the output bit related operations. Consequently, computing another function (1 more output bit) on the same 6 input bits would add only 0.55 s, and so on. For 6-to-6 bit gate it yields just above 10 seconds. On the memory front, we need 9.2 GB of RAM to store all key materials for the computation.
Optimisations This first implementation includes only those on ExtExpInner described in Section B.1. Over the total gate evaluation time, 60% (3.8 s) are spent on FFT forward and backward transforms. The 3.8 seconds break down into 0.9 sec for more than 350k FFT in dimension d
(R p and R q ), and 2.9 sec for only around 250 FFT in dimension d
for R pq . We estimate that the optimisations of Appendix B.4 will bring these 2.9 seconds down to 1 or 1.5 second at most. This rough estimate is based on partial implementation, soon to be confirmed after complete integration. The overall gate time should drop below 6 seconds and the cost of additional output bits become negligible.
. 12 We write L the canonical inclusion map
Note that the above formula can be extended to a Q-linear map Also consider the lift L taken modulo Q (assuming Q is coprime to d), simply replacing
Consider a Ring-LWE sample as defined in [12] : (ã,b =ãs +ẽ) ∈ (R/QR) 2 for smalls,ẽ ∈ R. We lift this sample to R/QR:
We define s = L((1 − X)s) and e = L((1 − X)s), and it holds that s = L Q ((1 − X)s) mod Q and e = L Q ((1 − X)ẽ) mod Q since s and e are integral. Therefore,
We also note that s, e are still small since the operator norm of 1 − X is less than 2: these Circulant-LWE samples are useful.
It remains to explain what this transformation does to uniform samples (ã,b) ∈ (R/QR) 2 . Assume that Q is coprime to d, it then holds that Q and (1 − X) are coprimes over the integral ringR d . Therefore, the multiplication by 1 − X over (R/QR) is a bijection, so the sample (ã, ( 
mod Q} of elements of R/QR whose coefficients sums to 0 modulo Q.
Lemma 11 (Hardness of Circulant-LWE). Assume that d is prime, and Q is coprime to d. If it is hard to distinguish samples (ã i ,b i =ã is +ẽ i ) ∈ (R/QR) 2 from uniform whereẽ i are independent random variables drawn from a distribution ψ, then the samples
2 are also hard to distinguish from uniform samples in S 
A.2 Security proofs for CLWE and CGSW Encryption schemes
Lemma 12 (Restatement of Lemma 4) . If the decisionalR-LWE problem is hard, then the Circulant-LWE scheme is cpa-secure for messages of the form m = X k .
Proof. IfR-LWE is hard, then by Lemma 11, the Circulant-LWE distribution is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over S 2 d,Q . To prove cpa-security, it suffices to show that, for any k ∈ Z/dZ and u = Q/t , we have S d,Q + uX k = S d,Q + u. This then shows that a Circulant-LWE encryption of m = X k is indistinguishable from a uniformly random sample from
Lemma 13 (Restatement of Lemma 5) . If the decisionalR-LWE problem is hard, then the Circulant-GSW scheme is cpa-secure.
Proof. Let C be a Circulant-GSW ciphertext. Each row of C is of the form (a, b) + (0, uB i m) or (a, b) + (uB i m, 0) where m = X k and (a, b) is a Circulant-LWE sample, and thus indistinguishable from a random element of S 2 d,Q . By the same argument as in the previous proof, each row of C is indistinguishable from a uniformly random samble from either (
where i only depends on the row number, not on m.
A.3 Simpler error distribution in CLWE for practice
In practice, most FHE schemes do not follow precisely the Ring-LWE problem definition admitting reduction to worst-case problem [25, 26] . For example, HElib [22] uses Ring-LWE with spherical errors in the coefficient embedding, and very sparse ternary secrets, and ignoring the co-different ideal R ∨ . The TFHE scheme [10] also relies on Ring-LWE with ternary secrets, which is not know to reduce to the regular Ring-LWE. Cutting such corners appears quite crucial to error growth management and therefore efficiency. We will follow this approach, and define adjust the distributions as follows.
-we proceed to sample secrets and error isotropically in S d,Q , while the above reduction leads to errors with a distortion factor (1 − X). This distortion seems to be an artefact of the proof, as it breaks symmetries: one could choose a different way of breaking those symmetries by replacing 1 − X by 1 − X e for any e coprime to d. Respecting the symmetries seems a better idea in the light of recent analysis [9, 28] . This variant could also be proved secure (with a loss of a constant factor about √ 2 on the size of the error), simply by adding more noise to make it spherical again, using the convolution lemma of [27] , but this would drag us away from the topic of this paper.
-we choose to use ternary secrets s, which, as in previous schemes leads to serious performance improvements due to smaller error growth. It has recently been showed that such choices make lattice attacks somewhat faster [1] , especially when s is very sparse: we will account for this refined analysis when measuring the concrete security of our proposed parameters.
Sampling of a. We sample a uniform in R d /(QR d ) under the constraint a(1) mod Q = 0 by choosing all the coefficients a i at random for i ≥ 1, and setting a 0 = − i>0 a i mod Q.
Sampling of s. When d is prime, we sample a a ternary s of density δ = 2/3 by choosing exactly δd/2 coefficients set to 1 and δd/2 coefficients set to −1. This implies that s(1) = 0, and s 2 = 2 δd/2 . Indeed, we find it preferable to fix its length to avoid sampling sparse keys that would be subtentially weaker.
Sampling of e. We wish to sample errors e with variance σ in a way that ensures e(1) = 0. We set:
where the a i 's and b i 's' are independant uniform exponents modulo d. One note that this distribution is invariant by permutation over {1, T, . . . , T d−1 } : we have preserved the symmetries of the ring. Note that this procedure would get rather slow for large σ, yet we won't exceed σ ≤ 8 in our parameter choices.
Remark 6. The above procedure would not be adapted for composite degree d, as more care is required to construct a lift as done in section A.1. Yet, while we will make use of circulant ring R d with composite degree d = pq, we will never directly construct ciphertexts over that ring. Indeed, the ciphertext in R d will be publicly constructed by tensoring two ciphertexts from R p and R q , and are therefore no easier to decrypt than the original ciphertexts over R p and R q .
B Optimizations
In this section, we present some optimization of the scheme for practice. Our implementation does include the optimizations from Sections B.1, B.2 and B.3. We left out the optimization from Section B.4, which requires substential modifications to our code base.
B.1 Accelerating ExtExpInner
Factoring Galois-KeySwitch sequences We note that it is possible to factor some operations when chaining ExtExpMultAdd α and ExtExpMultAdd α , by applying Galois αβ rather than Galois α followed by Galois β (together with the appropriate Key Switches), cf Fig. 2 . Furthermore, if y ∈ Z d contains repeated values, it is possible to re-index the inner product to make equal values contiguous, and skip useless Galois 1 operations. Those tricks also decrease the final error E by constant factors.
Pushing this trick to its limits, if is large enough, one could re-index the inner product so that the αβ all belong to a small 13 subset Z * d , allowing to decrease the size of the key material. In combination with the following optimization, this should lead to reduce the overall key-size by a significant factor.
Decreasing LWE dimension In our theoretical scheme, the homomorphic inner product in exponent operation is done over vectors of length = p + 1 where p is the dimension of of the secret in the LWE scheme.
In practice, we remark that this dimension is quite larger than needed for security, given the amount of noise and the modulus pq of those ciphertexts. We therefore proceed with an extra LWE key-switch just the combination of the LWE ciphertexts. In practice it allows to decrease the dimension by a factor between 2 and 3, which accelerates the ExtExpInner operations by the same factor. As a small added bonus, it also slightly decreases the error in the ciphertexts outputted by this function. 
B.2 Heuristic error propagation
Our theoretical analysis of the scheme used sub-gaussian analysis [33] to provide bounds on error propagation that are already significantly better than worst-case bounds. Yet those bounds are asymptotic, without explicit constants, and for some operations may not be perfectly tight. As in previous work [13, 10] , when it comes to choose practical parameters, we rely on a tighter but heuristic analysis of error propagation, essentially treating all random variables as independent gaussians. More precisely, considering that the critical random variable for correctness is obtained as the sum of many random variables, we only compute its variance as the sum of the variance of its terms, and treat this final result as Gaussian in accordance with the central limit Theorem (which is formally not applicable due to potential dependencies).
Linear Operations. For the linear operations Add, Mult and Galois operations, we use the same equations (3), (8) as in our sub-gaussian analysis, since it is tight in this case, but apply it to the standard deviation of each variable rather than the sub-gaussianity parameter.
Modulus Switching. For our analysis, we needed to randomize the rounding step to ensure subgaussianity without resorting to the randomness of the input ciphertext. Instead, in practice we use deterministic rounding and account for the randomness of the input ciphertext. Treating the rounding errors as independent uniform random variables in the interval [− 1 /2, 1 /2] allows to heuristically improve the error bound (4) down to
(g −T (x) i , g −T (y) i ), convert them to FFT format, and then only perform the tensoring step using the remark above. In comparison, the naive algorithm would have cost Θ(Kpq log pq): asymptotically, our new trick improves the complexity by a logarithmic factor Θ(log pq). The impact in practice may quite substantial also considering the large hidden constants in FFT operations.
Tracing down in the FFT domain. At last, we note that the trace operation Tr * Rpq/Rp can also be performed directly in the FFT domain in time Θ(pq) by summing the appropriate FFT coefficients. The allows to replace the final large backward FFT (in dimension pq) by a cheap backward FFT in dimension p. The cost of this step decreases form Θ(pq log pq) down to Θ(pq + p log p).
